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Buyer-Secured Party Conflicts and Automobiles: A
New Facet to an Old Problem
The automobile's unique combination of mobility, high resale
value, and ready acceptability as collateral frequently renders it the
subject of fraudulent transactions. A common example of such
fraud occurs when a person buys an automobile for a small down
payment, removes it to another state, sells it to a good faith pur-
chaser, and promptly defaults on his car payments.1 The resulting
controversy between the secured creditor and the innocent buyer
has been frequently addressed by courts and commentators alike.,
The 1972 revisions to U.C.C. section 9-103 removed many ambigui-
ties in the Code's treatment of this problem.3 One addition is sub-
section 9-103(2)(d), which provides that a consumer buyer who re-
lies on a clean local certificate of title takes the automobile free of
a foreign perfected security interest.' This guarantee to the con-
1. This scenario is commonly referred to as the "skip-state" problem.
2. E.g., GMAC v. Hill, 95 Ariz. 347, 390 P.2d 843 (1964); Atha v. Bockius, 39 Cal.2d 635,
248 P.2d 745 (1952); Strickland v. Motors Acceptance, Inc., 126 So.2d 156 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.
1960); First Nat'l Bank v. Stamper, 93 N.J.Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 (1966); Churchill Motors,
Inc. v. A.C. Lohman, Inc., 16 App.Div.2d 560, 229 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1962); GMAC v. Manheim
Motor Auction, 25 Pa.D.&C.2d 179 (Pa.Ct.Com.Pl. 1961); Phil Phillips Ford, Inc. v. St. Paul
Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 465 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. 1971); 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS iN
PERSONAL PRopRT'Y, ch.20 (1st ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as GELMORE]; Furnish, Multistate
Security Interests in Automobiles Under UCC Section 9-103, 1975 ARIz. ST. L.J. 293
[hereinafter cited as Furnish]; Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory
Automobiles, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 455 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Leary]; Rohner, Autos, Title
Certificates and UCC 9-103: The Draftsmen Try Again, 27 Bus. LAw. 1177 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Rohner]; Comment, The California Used Car Dealer and the Foreign Lien-A Study
in the Conflict of Laws, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 543 (1959) [hereinafter cited as California Used
Car Dealer]; Note, Interstate Movement of Motor Vehicles: Certificate of Title Acts and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 9 CREIGHTON L. REv. 373 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Certificate
of Title Acts and the U.C.C.1.
3. Revised Article 9 has been adopted in twenty-five states: Arizona, Arkansas, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Where the 1972 version of a U.C.C.
section differs materially from the previous version, the textual reference will be to either the
"revised section..." or "unrevised section . " All textual references to unrevised sec-
tions will be made in the past tense for clarity, even though many states have not adopted
revised Article 9. All references to the revised Code will be made in the present tense.
4. U.C.C. § 9-103(2)(d) (1972 version) reads:
If goods are brought into this state while a security interest therein is perfected in
any manner under the law of the jurisdiction from which the goods are removed
and a certificate of title is issued by this state and the certificate does not show
that the goods are subject to the security interest or that they may be subject to
security interests not shown on the certificate, the security interest is subordinate
to the rights of a buyer of the goods who is not in the business of selling goods of
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sumer buyer creates an inconsistency since nowhere in the Code is
such a buyer protected from a security interest perfected within the
same state.
This article will trace the development of non-Code law in the
"skip state" situation,5 and will examine changes made by the
U.C.C. in the law governing secured transactions in automobiles
covered by title certificates. Then, an effort will be made to recon-
cile within the Code the apparent conflict in revised Article Nine.
Finally, policy justifications will be advanced in favor of affording
consumer good faith purchasers' under clean titles in single state
transactions the same protection as that given to similar purchasers
in multi-state transactions under 9-103(2)(d).
THE PROBLEM
Suppose Dealer A in State X sells a car to B for his personal use.
A accepts a small down payment, and retains a security interest in
the car for the remainder of the purchase price. In compliance with
the laws of State X, A has the interest noted on the title certificate
which he retains in his possession. B, however, takes the car into
State Y, also a "full title"7 state, and fraudulently procures a certifi-
cate which does not reflect Dealer A's interest. B then sells the car
to C, a consumer purchaser who knows nothing of A's interest, and
relies on the clean title issued by his own state. The secured party
A discovers the removal, traces the car, and attempts to repossess
it from the consumer buyer. In a suit between A and C, which of
the two innocent parties has the better claim to the car? U.C.C.
revised section 9-103 is clear: the non-professional purchaser in good
faith will prevail.
Given the same facts with the exception that B does not remove
the automobile from the state, but obtains a second, clean certifi-
that kind to the extent that he gives value and receives delivery of the goods after
issuance of the certificate and without knowledge of the security interest.
5. See note 1 supra.
6. Throughout this article, the term good faith purchaser will be used as shorthand for
one who buys without knowledge of the security interest and for value. U.C.C. § 9-307(2).
7. All states with the possible exception of Kentucky now have some form of title legisla-
tion. Comment, In re Littlejohn: Equitable Departure from State Certificate of Title Act
Filing Requirements, 1975 UTAH L. Rav. 726, 727. Such legislation has been classified into
two categories: "full title" acts, which require notation of liens and encumbrances on the
certificate as a condition to perfection, and "incomplete" acts, under which notation is not
required. GiLMORE, supra note 1, at 553; Leary, supra note 2, at 458-59; Note, Security
Interests in Motor Vehicles Under the UCC: A New Chassis for Certificate of Title
Legislation. 70 YALE L.J. 995, at 996-98 (1961) [hereinafter cited as A New Chassis].
"Incomplete" acts have all but disappeared. Permanent Editorial Board, Review Committee
for Article Nine, FINAL Rzpoirr, at 238 (1971) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
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cate from the same state which issued the first, 9-103 no longer
applies, and the Code apparently dictates an opposite result. The
general rule is that a security interest in collateral continues despite
a fraudulent sale by the debtor.8 Section 9-307 embodies an excep-
tion to this rule. It provides that certain purchasers will take free of
a perfected security interest, and among those buyers so protected
are consumer purchasers in casual, second-hand sales from other
consumers.' A secured party may prevent the operation of this pro-
vision by filing a financing statement, or as the Official Comments
indicate, by compliance with the state's certificate of title legisla-
tion. 10 Therefore, in the intrastate context, since Dealer A properly
noted his security interest on the certificate of title of State X, his
security interest continues as against subsequent good faith pur-
chasers."
MULTI-STATE TRANSACTIONS
Non-Code Law
Automobile registration statutes were initially passed to produce
new revenue. 2 Their value for tracing stolen vehicles, however, was
quickly perceived, and registration receipts soon evolved into title
documents. 3 In addition, the pre-Code chattel recording system
became increasingly ineffective when applied to motor vehicles," so
title legislation often provided for notation of security interests on
the certificate." Title acts therefore developed as multi-purpose
statutes, and among the aims of such legislation were: 1) to compel
payment of sales taxes, 2) to prevent fraud and theft of motor vehi-
8. U.C.C. § 9-306(2); U.C.C. § 9-201.
9. U.C.C. § 9-307(2) provides:
In the case of consumer goods, a buyer takes free of a security interest even though
perfected if he buys without knowledge of the security interest, for value and for
his own personal, family or household purposes unless prior to the purchase the
secured party has filed a financing statement covering such goods.
This section has been construed to require that the goods be consumer goods in the hands of
the seller as well as the buyer. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Auto Owners Fin. Co.,
355 Mass. 487, 245 N.E.2d 437 (1969); Everett Nat'l Bank v. Deschuiteneer, 109 N.H. 112,
244 A.2d 196 (1968).
10. U.C.C. § 9-307(2), Comment 3. In addition, U.C.C. § 9-302(4)(1972 version) equates
compliance with certificate of title statutes and filing. See notes 96-107 infra and accompany-
ing text.
11. U.C.C. § 9-301 names the interests to which an unperfected security interest is subor-
dinate, and includes certain purchasers without knowledge of the security interest. By nega-
tive implication, the interests listed in 9-301 are in turn subordinate to a perfected security
interest. U.C.C. § 9-301, Comment 4.
12. GuLMORE, supra note 2, at 552.
13. Id.; A New Chassis, supra note 7, at 995.
14. See Leary, supra note 2.
15. A New Chassis, supra note 7, at 995.
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cles, 3) to lend stability to the business climate surrounding the sale
of cars," 4) to prevent trafficking in stolen automobiles," and 5) to
provide a ready means for ascertaining ownership without recourse
to circumstantial evidence. 8
Before all the states had enacted title laws," courts in full title
states considered numerous conflicts between foreign secured par-
ties from non-title or incomplete title states, and local purchasers
with clean local certificates. 0 If the secured party had not complied
with his own state's filing laws, he was unperfected and the local
purchaser would take free of the foreign lien.2' If, however, the for-
eign lienor had properly recorded his interest in the appropriate
state or county office, a conflict of laws arose. The resolution of this
conflict involved a choice between two innocent parties, the buyer
who had relied on a clean title, and the foreign secured party who
had diligently complied with the law of his own state.
The principle invoked to solve these cases was the doctrine of
comity, which required recognition of a perfected foreign lien in the
absence of express statutory provision to the contrary.22 Despite the
16. In re Littlejohn, 519 F.2d 356, 358 (10th Cir. 1975).
17. Id., Mutual Fin. Co. v. Municipal Employees Union Local, 110 Ohio App. 341, 165
N.E.2d 435 (1960).
18. In re Littlejohn, 519 F.2d 356, 358 (10th Cir. 1975); Jorgensen v. Morris, 122 Colo. 94,
220 P.2d 359 (1950). Still another purpose is to insure that lenders and purchasers, be they
individuals or dealers, may ascertain the status of a seller's title without recourse to official
records. Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 519 P.2d 354
(1974). But see Doherty v. Obregon, 6 Ariz.App. 401, 433 P.2d 52 (1967); Castner v. Ziemer,
125 So.2d 134 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1960).
19. See note 7 supra. A number of title acts included provisions to the effect that no
interest in an automobile would be recognized unless that interest were evidenced by a
certificate of title. GiLmoIE, supra note 2, at 554. See Note, The "Conclusiveness" Provision
of the Iowa Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Statute, 42 IowA L. Rlv. 72 (1956). These
"conclusiveness" provisions caused problems when secured parties without local certificates
sought to enforce foreign liens against local purchasers with clean titles. See notes 20-31 infra
and accompanying text.
20. E.g., Capital Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. GMAC, 105 So.2d 899 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1958);
Associates Discount Corp. v. Colonial Fin. Co., 88 Ohio App. 205, 98 N.E.2d 848 (1950). The
problem still exists when a car moves from an "incomplete" title state to a "full title" state.
See note 7 supra.
21. See, e.g., GMAC v. Hill, 95 Ariz. 347, 390 P.2d 843 (1964); Furnish, supra note 2, at
296-98.
22. GK.moa., supra note 2, at 551.
[The rule of comity] appears to be founded upon the principles of equity and
natural justice. As applied to cases of the character of the one before us, it can
produce no harsh or unjust results. The principle underlying it may be analogized
to that upon which the owner of property stolen from him and taken or transported
to another state may follow the thief into the latter state and reclaim or take
possession of the pilfered goods or chattels wherever found. A state may, it is true,
refuse to recognize the rule of comity in such cases; but, should it do so, it would
become a party to every such fraudulent transaction.
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almost universal acceptance of this rule, exceptions evolved which
sometimes resulted in decisions for the local good faith purchaser.23
Courts looked beyond the rule of comity to consider such factors as
the secured party's consent to removal, 2  the lienor's lack of dili-
gence after knowledge of the removal, 25 the secured party's having
clothed the defrauder with indicia of title,2 and even his negligence
in extending credit to the debtor in the first place. 7
Each of these exceptions to comity is a variant of the estoppel
maxim that "when one of two innocent persons must suffer through
the fraud of a third person, the one who made it possible for the
fraud to be perpetrated must bear the loss. ''28 One problem with this
approach is that the use of an estoppel theory is in effect a criticism
of another state's standards of perfection. 29 Furthermore, the doc-
trine of estoppel is only useful in cases where one party is essentially
at fault and is thus not "innocent."0 Its applicability is question-
able in situations where the secured party has perfected his lien by
notation on the title, and the debtor fraudulently obtains a clean
certificate to resell the car. In this setting, where both parties are
truly innocent, the comity-estoppel approach fails to provide a
framework within which the conflicting interests may be assessed.
Motor Inv. Co. v. Breslauer, 64 Cal.App. 230, 221 P. 700, 703 (1923). For thorough discussions
of comity as applied to security interests in motor vehicles, see Leary, supra note 2, and
California Used Car Dealer, supra note 2.
23. GiMoRE, supra note 2; California Used Car Dealer, supra note 2.
24. Seely v. First Bank & Trust, 64 Misc.2d 845, 315 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1970); RESTATEMENT
OF CONFUCT OF LAWS §§ 269-71 (1934).
25. GMAC v. Hill, 95 Ariz. 347, 390 P.2d 843 (1964); First Nat'l Bank v. Sprigg, 209
Cal.App.2d 258, 25 Cal.Rptr. 838 (1962); see GMAC v. Capital Discount, Inc., 165 A.2d 779
(Mun.Ct.App.D.C. 1960).
26. Atha v. Bockius, 39 Cal.2d 635, 248 P.2d 745 (1952).
27. See Associates Discount Corp. v. McKinney, 230 N.C. 727, 55 S.E.2d 513 (1949).
28. GMAC v. Manheim Motor Auction, 25 Pa.D.&C.2d 179, 1 U.C.C. RTRa. 388, 391-92
(1961). Accord, GMAC v. Hill, 95 Ariz. 347, 390 P.2d 843 (1964); Finance Corp. v. Bauer,
167 Colo. 519, 448 P.2d 791 (1968); GMAC v. Capital Discount, Inc., 165 A.2d 779 (Mun.Ct.
App.D.C. 1960); Motor Credit Corp. v. Woolverton, 99 So.2d 286 (Fla. 1957); McDonald v.
Peoples Auto. Loan & Fin. Corp., 115 Ga.App. 483, 154 S.E.2d 886 (1967); Muir v. Jefferson
Credit Corp., 108 N.J.Super. 586, 262 A.2d 33 (1970); Heaston v. Martinez, 3 Utah 2d 259,
282 P.2d 833 (1955). Cf. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Municipal Employees Union Local, 110 Ohio App.
341, 165 N.E.2d 435 (1960) (placed the loss on the secured party under the equitable principle
that he who first trusted the wrongdoer must bear the burden). See generally Leary, supra
note 2, at 468.
29. Furnish, supra note 2, at 296. In theory comity applies only when the foreign security
interest is perfected. Id. But see First Nat'l Bank v. Sprigg, 209 Cal.App.2d 258, 25 Cal.Rptr.
838 (1962) (court evaded the question of perfection in Kansas and awarded the car to the good
faith purchaser on the basis of estoppel).
30. California Used Car Dealer, supra note 2, at 557. The author notes that the maxim is
self-contradictory in that if one party is responsible for the occurrence of the fraud, he cannot
be innocent. Conversely, where both parties are innocent, neither is in any way to blame and
estoppel is inapplicable.
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In a dual certificate case, a court must weigh the divergent goals of
protecting retail transactions, and stabilizing credit operations,"1 so
that these controversies may be equitably and consistently decided.
The Unrevised Article Nine
The pre-Code combination of title legislation with the common
law doctrines of comity and estoppel was inadequate to deal effec-
tively with the "skip state" problem involving one, much less two,
certificates of title.32 The Uniform Commercial Code as initially
promulgated represented little improvement. One aim of Article
Nine was "to provide a simple and unified structure within which
the immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions
can go forward with less cost and with greater certainty."' ' Ironi-
cally, the drafters' decision to defer to state title acts" increased the
uncertainty and confusion already existing in the area of motor
vehicle secured transactions, 35 and did nothing to promote uniform-
ity.3 1 The security aspects 37 of many title acts forced courts to recon-
cile U.C.C. provisions and title act requirements which were appar-
ently contradictory. Most courts concluded that the U.C.C. provi-
sions controlled. 38 For example, Rattan Chevrolet, Inc. v. Associates
31. Id., at 554-55. These goals are divergent because both cannot be satisfied in buyer-
secured party conflicts. If retail transactions are to be absolutely protected, the buyer of a
used automobile will never be divested of possession. On the other hand, if credit operations
are to be stable, the secured party should always be able to repossess collateral which has
been fraudulently sold to a good faith purchaser. When both the buyer and the secured party
are innocent, a balance must be struck between these two goals, since the controversy cannot
be resolved by placing blame on either party.
32. GILMoRE, supra note 2; Leary, supra note 2; California Used Car Dealer, supra note
2.
33. U.C.C. § 9-101, Official Comment.
34. U.C.C. § 9-302(3). An early draft incorporated a complete title act within the Code.
U.C.C. §§ 7-801 et. seq. (May 1949 Draft).
35. See generally, Welsh, Security Interests in Motor Vehicles Under Section 9-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 37 CIN. L. Rav. 265 (1968); A New Chassis, supra note 7.
36. One of the underlying purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code is "to make uniform
the law among the various jurisdictions." U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c).
37. These security aspects are those provisions in title acts which relate to the creation,
perfection and priorities of security interests. See, e.g., UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE CERTIFICATE
OF TrrLE AND ANi-THrr ACT § 20, which provides that "a security interest in a vehicle of a
type for which a certificate of title is required is not valid against creditors of the owner or
subsequent transferees or lienholders of the vehicle unless perfected as provided in this act."
38. In reconciling the U.C.C. and title acts, several courts applied the "substantial com-
pliance" standard for minor errors in financing statements to title act requirements which
formerly had been strictly construed. In re Hollis, 301 F.Supp. 1 (D.Conn. 1969); In re
Pollack, 3 U.C.C.Rptr. 267 (D.Conn. 1966). Cf. In re Littlejohn, 519 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1975)
(Kansas law required purchasers to make application for title; court gave the secured party
priority over the bankruptcy trustee even though purchasers never applied for title and thus
bank's security interest was never perfected by notation on the certificate of title.) The
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Discount Corp.,39 involved a conflict between the Code and the
Texas certificate of title act. Rattan had purchased three automo-
biles from a dealer whom Associates financed. When Associates
sought to foreclose against the cars, Rattan asserted that it was a
buyer in the ordinary course of business under U.C.C. section 9-
307(1) and thus the finance company's lien was ineffective. 0 Asso-
ciates argued that the title act governed, and that since it had
retained the manufacturer's certificates of origin, it had effectively
prevented Rattan from acquiring the cars free of liens and encum-
brances. 4 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals construed the U.C.C.
and the title act as being in pari materia.42 Furthermore, the court
concluded from the legislative intent of the U.C.C. that the Code
should control. 3 Rattan Chevrolet thus gave full effect to the draf-
ters' intent that the U.C.C. be a "unified coverage of the subject
matter,"" and was a salutory step toward uniformity despite the
Code deference to state title laws.
Although courts usually resolved conflicts with title acts in favor
of the U.C.C., uncertainty remained because of ambiguities in the
unrevised choice of law provisions, particularly 9-103.15 When a car
substantial compliance standard is found in U.C.C. § 9-402(5)(1958 version), and in § 9-
402(8) (1972 version).
39. 443 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App. 1969), aff'd 462 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1970).
40. Id., at 362.
41. Id., at 364.
42. Id., at 367. The court noted that the U.C.C. and the title act dealt in some particulars
with the same subject matter and had similar purposes. Accord, Anderson v. First Nat'l
Bank, 243 Ark. 977, 423 S.W.2d 273 (1968); Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super.
503, 168 A.2d 600 (1961). But see Doenges-Glass, Inc. v. GMAC, 175 Colo. 518, 488 P.2d 879
(1971) (non-uniform amendment of U.C.C. § 9-103 removed question of title to motor vehicle
from that section's application); Commonwealth Loan Co. v. Berry, 2 Ohio St.2d 169, 207
N.E.2d 545 (1965) (gave a common law garageman's lien priority over a valid chattel mort-
gage noted on the certificate, even though under the U.C.C. the mortgagee would have
prevailed); GMC Superior Trucks, Inc. v. Irving Bank & Trust Co., 463 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.Ct.
Civ.App. 1971) (specific provision of the title act giving priority in order of notation con-
trolled more general provision of U.C.C. giving mechanics liens priority over perfected secu-
rity interest). See generally Note, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Texas Certificate
of Title Act Are In Pari Materia, 25 Sw. L.J. 499 (1971).
43. 443 S.W.2d 360, 368 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App. 1969), aff'd 462 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1970).
Accord, In re Butler's Tire & Battery Co., 17 U.C.C. Rptr. 1363 (D.Ore. 1975); Maley v.
National Acceptance Co., 250 F.Supp. 841 (N.D.Ga. 1966); Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colo-
rado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 519 P.2d 354 (1974); McDonald v. Peoples Auto. Loan
& Fin. Corp., 115 Ga.App. 483, 154 S.E.2d 886 (1967). The Texas Supreme Court affirmed
the decision in Rattan on the basis of the general repealer section of the Code, U.C.C. § 10-
103, which reads, "Except as provided in the following section, all acts and parts of acts
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed."
44. U.C.C. § 1-104.
45. Because of the ambiguities in the choice of law provisions of the unrevised Code,
courts were forced to use title legislation and the common law to resolve controversies. Fur-
nish, supra note 2, at 293; see generally Rohner, supra note 2; Comment, Uniform Commer-
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had been removed from a non-title state to another non-title state,
9-103(2) or (3) clearly governed, depending respectively on whether
the vehicle was used for business or consumer purposes." The addi-
tion of 9-103(4)" caused confusion over whether the presence of a
certificate requiring notation suspended operation of 9-103(2) and
(3) .4
A number of cases held section 9-103(4) completely inapplicable
when a car was removed from a non-title state to a title state." In
First National Bank v. Stamper,5" the debtor Stamper bought an
automobile in New York under a contract giving the seller a security
interest, which the seller assigned to the plaintiff bank. Stamper
then moved to New Jersey, where he obtained a certificate of owner-
ship which did not reflect the bank's security interest. On the basis
of this certificate he sold the car to Sharp, who had no knowledge
of the New York lien. In the ensuing contest between the bank and
Sharp, the court held that the bank had perfected in New York, a
non-title state, and that unrevised 9-103(4) was inapplicable. In-
stead, the court applied 9-103(3), and held that it gave a secured
party absolute perfection during the first four months after re-
moval. 51 Since all events had occurred within four months, 9-103(3)
cial Code-Perfection of Security Interests in Multi-State Transactions When Property Is
Covered By A Certificate of Title, 47 B.U.L. REv. 430 (1967); Note, Interstate Movement of
Motor Vehicles Subject to Security Interests: A Case for Repealing U.C.C. J 9-103(4), 54
CORNEiL L. REv. 610 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Repealing § 9-103(4)1; Certificate of Title
Acts and the U C. C., supra note 2; Note, Resolving Conflicts Arising From the Interstate
Movement of Motor Vehicles: The Original U C. C. § 9-103 and Its Successor, 35 OMO ST.
L.J. 990 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Resolving Conflicts]. See notes 46-61 infra and accompa-
nying text.
Section 9-103, the principle choice of law provision, was drafted "in the light of the uncer-
tainty whether the Code would be widely adopted, and the emphasis was on conflicting rules
of law and a desire to make the Code rules applicable where such a result was justified under
general principles." FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 229-30.
46. Repealing § 9-103(4), supra note 45, at 611.
47. U.C.C. § 9-103(4) (1958 version) reads:
Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), if personal property is covered by a certifi-
cate of title issued under a statute of this state or any other jurisdiction which
requires indication on a certificate of title of any security interest in the property
as a condition of perfection, then the perfection is governed by the law of the
jurisdiction which issued the certificate.
48. Repealing § 9-103(4), supra note 45, at 610-14.
49. First Nat'l Bank v. Stamper, 93 N.J.Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 (1966); Churchill Mo-
tors, Inc. v. A.C. Lohman, Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 560, 229 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1962); Casterline v.
GMAC, 195 Pa.Super. Ct. 344, 171 A.2d 813 (1961).
50. 93 N.J.Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 (1966). Actually the court did apply § 9-103(4) and
held it to mean that New Jersey law controlled and New Jersey, in § 9-103(3), recognized
perfected foreign security interests for four months.
51. Accord, Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A.C. Lohman, Inc., 16 App.Div.2d 560, 229 N.Y.S.2d
570 (1962); Casterline v. GMAC, 195 Pa.Super.Ct. 344, 171 A.2d 813 (1961). Contra, Arrow
Ford, Inc. v. Western Landscape Constr. Co., 23 Ariz.App. 281, 532 P.2d 553 (1975).
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protected the New York secured party as against the New Jersey
good faith purchaser.
When the automobile was moved from a title state into another
title state, unrevised section 9-103 was even less helpful." If no
certificate had been issued in the second state, 9-103(4) was fairly
clear that the law of the state from which the automobile was re-
moved controlled the issues of perfection and its effect as against
subsequent purchasers. 3 The section, however, did not cover the
case where there was more than one certificate outstanding." There-
fore in an interstate, dual certificate situation, courts interpreting
the unrevised section 9-103 were again forced to apply non-Code
law. In GMAC v. Birkett L. Williams Co., 55 the court would have
given priority to a Texas security interest properly perfected by
notation on the certificate of title, or it could have protected a local
purchaser who relied on the clean Ohio title." Because of the prob-
lems in interpreting 9-103, the court reverted to non-U.C.C. cases
to resolve the issue, and held that the Ohio certificate of title did
not, absent estoppel, provide protection against a properly perfected
foreign security interest. 7
Although unrevised section 9-103(4) exhibited a preference for
title certificates, 58 its ambiguity led to decisions which instead dem-
onstrated a preference for foreign perfected security interests de-
spite issuance of a local clean certificate.59 Furthermore, as the
Williams case exhibits, 0 the section's failure to encompass multiple
certificate situations prompted judicial reliance on pre-Code law,
which was inadequate to resolve dual certificate cases.' This tend-
ency to return to non-Code law frustrated the Code's attempts at
uniformity in the area of interstate security interests in motor vehi-
52. Furnish, supra note 2, at 300.
53. GMAC v. Whisnant, 387 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1968). The same reasoning is applicable
when the car moves from a title state into a non-title state.
54. See Repealing § 9-103(4), supra note 45, at 615; Certificate of Title Acts and the UCC,
supra note 2, at 393.
55. 46 Ohio Op. 311, 243 N.E.2d 882 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1969).
56. Although both Texas and Ohio were full title states at the time, the car had appar-
ently been "washed" in Rhode Island, then a non-title state, before being brought to Ohio.
Id., at 883.
57. Id., at 889.
58. Furnish, supra note 2, at 299.
59. See First Nat'l Bank v. Stamper, 93 N.J.Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 (1966); Churchill
Motors, Inc. v. Lohman, Inc., 16 App.Div.2d 560, 229 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1962); GMAC v. Birkett
L. Williams Co., 46 Ohio Op. 311, 243 N.E.2d 882 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1969); Casterline
v. GMAC, 195 Pa.Super. 344, 171 A.2d 813 (1961).
60. 46 Ohio Op. 311, 243 N.E.2d 882 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1969).
61. See notes 22-31 supra and accompanying text.
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cles, and actually complicated matters by adding one more element,
the U.C.C., to an already chaotic body of law.
The Revised Code
Revised section 9-103 has been called a "band-aid on a crippled
limb," 2 but it resolves at least some of its predecessor's ambigui-
ties. 3 For example, the revised 9-103 clearly makes the four-month
period of protection a grace period for reperfecting in the second
state, rather than an absolute period of perfection. 4 Thus, lapse of
the grace period without reperfection means that purchasers during
the four months after removal take free of the security interest. 5
In addition, the 1972 section 9-103 includes a sub-section applying
to goods covered by a certificate of title.6 Sub-section (2) does not
explicitly address the multiple certificate problem, but at least as
to consumer good faith buyers, 7 9-103(2)(d) provides the same re-
sult whether the goods were originally perfected by filing or by nota-
tion on a certificate of title. Furthermore, 9-103(2)(d) protects the
62. Rohner, supra note 2, at 1193.
63. See generally Furnish, supra note 2; Rohner, supra note 2; Resolving Conflicts, supra
note 45.
64. See note 51 supra and cAses cited therein.
65. U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d)(i); FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 236.
66. U.C.C. § 9-103(2) reads as follows:
(a) This subsection applies to goods covered by a certificate of title issued under
a statute of this state or of another jurisdiction under the law of which indication
of a security interest on the certificate is required as a condition of perfection.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, perfection and the effect of
perfection or non-perfection of the security interest are governed by the law (includ-
ing the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction issuing the certificate until four
months after the goods are removed from that jurisdiction and thereafter until the
goods are registered in another jurisdiction, but in any event not beyond surrender
of the certificate. After the expiration of that period, the goods are not covered by
the certificate of title within the meaning of this section.
(c) Except with respect to the rights of a buyer described in the next paragraph,
a security interest perfected in another jurisdiction otherwise than by notation on
a certificate of title, in goods brought into this state and thereafter covered by a
certificate of title issued by this state is subject to the rules stated in paragraph
(d) of subsection (1).
(d) If goods are brought into this state while a security interest therein is perfected
in any manner under the law of the jurisdiction from which the goods are removed
and a certificate of title is issued by this state and the certificate does not show
that the goods are subject to the security interest or that they may be subject to
security interests not shown on the certificate, the security interest is subordinate
to the rights of a buyer of the goods who is not in the business of selling goods of
that kind to the extent that he gives value and receives delivery of the goods after
issuance of the certificate and without knowledge of the security interest.
67. Illinois extends the protection of 9-103(2)(d) to all buyers, including dealers, by elimi-
nating the language "who is not in the business of selling goods of that kind." ILL.REV.STAT.
ch. 26, § 9-103(2)(d) (1977).
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consumer buyer against the foreign secured party who has perfected
by notation even when the original certificate remains outstanding.
The provision thus appears to be a simple guarantee that a person
who buys on the basis of a clean local certificate will not be subject
to the rights of a foreign perfected secured party.6 8
Section 9-103(2)(d) is subject to two qualifications. First, since
sub-section (2)(d) speaks only in terms of a certificate issued by
"this" state, the buyer is protected only if he relies on a certificate
of the state in which he buys."9 If the title has been "washed" in
another state, and the buyer relies on a clean certificate of that
state, he is not protected by 9-103(2)(d) although he is no less de-
frauded.70 Second, if the buyer relies on a title which bears a legend
stating that the vehicle may be subject to an undisclosed lien, the
buyer will take subject to a perfected foreign security interest.7' This
warning, though, hardly constitutes notice to the average con-
sumer.7" Even if such language places the buyer on constructive
notice, he rarely has the means to protect himself. 3 Notwithstand-
ing these limitations, section 9-103(2)(d) is an improvement over
both non-Code law and the unrevised U.C.C. in that it gives clear
protection in many instances to a consumer buyer who relies on a
clean certificate of title, without resort to the uncertain application
of estoppel.
DUAL TITLES IN THE SINGLE STATE CONTEXT
The primary difference between the single and the multi-state
situations is that the existence of non-title states and the lack of
uniformity among title acts have made interstate fraud easier than
fraud within a single state." Nevertheless the possibility that a
68. The Review Committee for Article Nine affirmed this conclusion when it stated that
"consumer buyers who give value and take delivery without knowledge of the security interest
in situations like Stamper should be protected in their reliance on local clean certificates of
title." FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 241.
69. See Resolving Conflicts, supra note 45, at 998.
70. The fact that the title is out-of-state, however, may be sufficient to place the buyer
on constructive notice.
71. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 241. The Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title
and Anti-Theft Act provides for such a legend to be placed on a certificate of title when the
department is not satisfied there are no undisclosed interests. UNIFORM MOTOR VEmciz CER-
TIFICATE OF TITLE AND ANTI-THEFT ACT § 50. This kind of warning typically appears when an
automobile is moved from an "incomplete" or non-title state into a full title state. Thus, as
more and more states become full title states, the seeming necessity for the legend will
disappear.
72. The language probably means no more than "other obtuse form language encountered
by laymen." Resolving Conflicts, supra note 45, at 999.
73. Id.
74. See generally Leary, supra note 2; Rohner, supra note 2; Note, The Near-Absolute
Rights of the Holder of an Ohio Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title, 15 W. REs. L. REv. 785
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debtor will be able to procure two certificates for one automobile
cannot be dismissed in either the multi-state or the intrastate set-
ting.7" Even if the secured party retains possession of the original
title, fraud can occur resulting in issuance of a clean duplicate.7'
Mistakes can be made, the motor vehicle department may maintain
inadequate records, or the clerk may fail to, or be bribed not to,
check records that would reveal the existence of an outstanding
lien."
Although the chances of obtaining two title certificates for one car
are greater in the multi-state situation than in the single state con-
text, the intrastate controversy presents the harder case for two
reasons. First, although the "skip state" case usually involves two
innocent parties injured by a third, the dual certificate context in-
cludes another party, the motor vehicle department which issued
the clean certificate." Dual certificates may issue from different
states because of the lack of uniformity among title acts.79 In the
single state case, however, no such excuse exists, and the buyer and
secured party should be able to rely on their state motor vehicle
department to issue a clean duplicate only when the car is unen-
cumbered.
Second, title acts were drafted on a theory of one title for each
car, and both the U.C.C. and the acts suggest that there should be
one title on the basis of which all may rely to ascertain ownership
(1964). However, as the number of full title states increases, resulting in fewer states where
title can be easily "washed," there is less reason to differentiate between the single and multi-
state settings.
75. The facts in several cases demonstrate that although interstate fraud may be easier,
car owners have been able to obtain duplicate titles from the same state in a number of ways.
E.g., Doherty v. Obregon, 6 Ariz.App. 401, 433 P.2d 52 (1967) (defrauder obtained a duplicate
before car was encumbered, then used original to secure loan and duplicate to sell car);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Associates Discount Corp., 246 Ark. 118, 436 S.W.2d 809 (1969)
(lienholder retained original, but dealer forged a release and received clean duplicate); May
v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 100 So.2d 651 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1958) (debtor received clean original
by mistake, then got clean duplicate by fraudulently stating he had mistakenly destroyed
original); Vannoy Chevrolet v. Baum, 260 Iowa 1011, 151 N.W.2d 515 (1967); First Nat'l Bank
v. Provident Fin. Co., 176 Neb. 45, 125 N.W.2d 78 (1963) (defrauder, by stating original had
been lost, obtained clean duplicate even though original showed encumbrance); Yarwood v.
DeLage, 91 N.E.2d 272 (Ohio App. 1949) (while first certificate was held by bank, owner sold
car; buyer fraudulently stated he had built car from assembled parts and obtained second,
clean certificate); South Texas Bank v. Renteria, 523 S.W.2d 780 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App. 1975)
(owner obtained certified copy, using it to secure a loan, and then sold the car on the basis
of the clean original).
76. E.g., Bettis v. Manhattan Credit Co., 230 Ark. 686, 324 S.W.2d 352 (1959); Yarwood
v. DeLage, 91 N.E.2d 272 (Ohio App. 1949).
77. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 564.
78. Rohner, supra note 2, at 1190.
79. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
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of and encumbrances on a given motor vehicle.8 0 When two state
title acts are involved, the problem is to determine which state's
laws apply. Once this conflict of laws is resolved, the question be-
comes simply whether that state will recognize interests not evi-
denced by its own title certificates. When the same state has issued
both certificates, however, the central issue is not which law con-
trols. Instead, the difficulty is that the applicable title act has no
provision governing priority conflicts between innocent dual title
holders. Thus the problem is not a conflict of laws, but a gap in the
applicable law.
In a single state controversy between holders of original and du-
plicate titles, sn non-Code law apparently favors the party who first
obtained an interest in the car. When the issuance of a duplicate
results from theft, the courts are nearly unanimous that the owner's
rights cannot be cut off by a good faith purchaser. This result is
based on the traditional rule that a thief, because he has no title,
cannot transfer title. s3 In pre-Code cases where theft was not in-
80. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 557; Certificate of Title Acts and the U. C.C., supra note 2,
at 393.
81. Issuance of a duplicate may result in one car having two certificates outstanding, each
of which represents a separate interest. Therefore the practice of issuing duplicates necessar-
ily undercuts the reliability of a state's titles. Nevertheless, this practice is justified by the
fact that public convenience outweighs the possibility of harm caused by fraud. California
Used Car Dealer, supra note 2, at 548 n.43.
A number of states attempt to enhance their titles through statutory provisions and/or
cases to the effect that a certificate of title is prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on
it. E.g., Federico v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 140 Colo. 145, 343 P.2d 830 (1959); Capital
Auto. Co. v. Continental Credit Corp., 117 Ga.App. 451, 160 S.E.2d 836 (1968); Spaulding v.
Peoples State Bank, 25 Ill.App.3d 118, 323 N.E.2d 143 (1975); COLO.REv.STAT. § 42-6-107
(1973); ILL.REV.STAT. ch. 951,/2, § 3-107(c) (1977). In a dual certificate case, however, this
evidentiary force is of little effect. A title certificate is not conclusive and can be rebutted.
E.g., Masterson v. Tomlinson, 424 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1968); Avis Rent-A-Car System v.
Woelfel, 155 Colo. 207, 393 P.2d 551 (1964); Fischer v. Bernard's Surf, 217 So.2d 576 (Fla.
Dist.Ct.App. 1969); Spaulding v. Peoples State Bank, 25 Ill.App.3d 118, 323 N.E.2d 143
(1975). Therefore when there are two certificates, each is defeated by the other.
82. See R.S. Evans Motors, Inc. v. Hanson, 130 So.2d 297 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1961) (al-
though no connection was shown between the Iowa certificates, two lienholders whose claims
were based on the original certificate had priority over a bailee in possession whose bailor had
been a good faith purchaser under the duplicate); May v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 100 So.2d 651
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1958) (chattel mortgagee who held fraudulently obtained duplicate pre-
vailed over good faith purchaser who later relied on clean original issued by mistake); Vannoy
Chevrolet v. Baum, 260 Iowa 1011, 151 N.W.2d 515 (1967) (dealer under properly assigned
original was entitled to possession over good faith purchaser under fraudulently obtained
duplicate). This tendency to favor the first acquired interest in the car is contrary to the
principle that he who first trusted the wrongdoer must bear the loss. See Mutual Fin. Co. v.
Municipal Employees Union Local, 110 Ohio App. 341, 165 N.E.2d 435 (1960). See generally
Leary, supra note 2, at 468.
83. E.g., Bettis v. Manhattan Credit Co., 230 Ark. 686, 324 S.W.2d 352 (1959); Avis Rent-
A-Car System v. Woelfel, 155 Colo. 207, 393 P.2d 551 (1964); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Gall,
15 Ohio St.2d 261, 240 N.E.2d 502 (1968); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Enzolera, 164 Neb. 38, 81
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volved and where the person committing the fraud either owned the
automobile or was the debtor in a secured transaction, a good faith
purchaser similarly could not cut off the rights of a prior owner or
perfected secured party. 4 This result is in accord with U.C.C. sec-
tion 9-306 which gives a secured party priority over a subsequent
good faith purchaser.85
The harshness of this approach has led states to require that
duplicates should be marked as such, and should bear a legend
stating that the car may be subject to the rights of a person holding
the original.8" Such provisions suggest that the holder of the original
will always prevail,8" and further, that these warnings place a pro-
spective buyer on notice, thus preventing him from attaining the
status of a good faith purchaser.88
Controversies between the holder of an original and the holder of
a duplicate bearing this kind of warning should not be decided by
giving automatic priority to the original title. The legend does noth-
ing to prevent fraud. A car owner can easily obtain both an original
N.W.2d 588 (1957); Hertz Corp. v. Hardy, 197 Pa.Super. 466, 178 A.2d 833 (1962). Ohio for a
time protected a local purchaser who relied on a clean Ohio title even when the car had been
stolen from the foreign secured party's debtor. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Pottmeyer, 176
Ohio. St. 1, 197 N.E.2d 343 (1964), but Pottmeyer was subsequently overruled by Hardware
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Gall, 15 Ohio St.2d 261, 240 N.E.2d 502 (1968). Because they are
dependent on a thief's complete lack of title, theft cases may not be controlling when a good
faith purchaser attempts to cut off the rights of a secured party. See notes 120-137 infra and
accompanying text.
84. May v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 100 So.2d 651 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1958); see Doherty v.
Obregon, 6 Ariz.App. 401, 433 P.2d 52 (1967); Federico v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 140
Colo. 145, 343 P.2d 830 (1959); R.S. Evans Motors Inc. v. Hanson, 130 So.2d 297 (Fla.Dist.
Ct.App. 1961). In an Iowa case decided after the effective date of the Code in that state,
the supreme court held that the holder of an original Iowa certificate was not defeated by a
good faith purchaser whose claim was evidenced by a second certificate which had been
obtained by assignment of a duplicate title issued on the basis of a false affidavit. Vannoy
Chevrolet v. Baum, 260 Iowa 1011, 151 N.W.2d 515 (1967). (The Code went into effect in Iowa
on July 4, 1966). The case did not involve a secured party, however, and was decided without
mention of the U.C.C.
85. U.C.C. § 9-306 provides that a security interest continues despite a sale by the debtor.
Section 9-307 allows a good faith purchaser to take free of the security interest, however 9-
307 apparently does not protect such a purchaser in an intrastate dual title setting. See notes
96-107 infra and accompanying text.
86. E.g., UNIFORM MOTOR VzHIcLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND ANTI-THEFr ACT § 13.
87. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 564. Accord, South Texas Bank v. Renteria, 523 S.W.2d 780
(Tex.Ct.Civ.App. 1975).
88. See Certificate of Title Acts and the U C. C., supra note 2, at 388-89. One court has
even indicated that in a state which issues duplicates, a prospective buyer of a used automo-
bile should make a check of official records when confronted with an original title. May v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 100 So.2d 651, 653 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1958). This approach seems back-
ward, since an original title in no way gives notice that a duplicate has been issued, while a
duplicate always indicates the possible existence of an original. The court reasoned, however,
that since duplicates were the current state of the title, a check should be made before relying
on an original.
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and duplicate title, then encumber the vehicle using the duplicate,"
and resell the car to a good faith purchaser on the basis of the clean
original. 0 In addition, as long as legitimate reasons exist for the
issuance of duplicates, they should be afforded the same reliability
as originals. Third, making duplicate certificates serve as construc-
tive notice of other claims impedes the free alienability of automo-
biles covered by such titles.' Finally, the consumer buyer, who is
most likely to place sole reliance on a certificate of title, is unlikely
to comprehend the legal significance of a duplicate or a legend that
the car may be subject to other interests.2
A better approach would be for states to clearly articulate the
extent to which one may justifiably rely on their clean certificates.
Regrettably few courts have addressed this issue, and none have
considered whether reliance on a duplicate may be justified. 3 More-
over, the cases which hold that a clean title may be relied upon can
usually be explained on other grounds. 4
89. A prospective creditor who at this time checks any official records will find that the
owner has clear title.
90. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 563 n.1. South Texas Bank v. Renteria, 523 S.W.2d 780
(Tex.Ct.Civ.App. 1975), involved those facts almost exactly. The debtor had obtained a
certified copy of the certificate of title, as well as the original. He then borrowed $3,000 from
his employer, who in turn borrowed the same amount from the defendant bank. The title to
the automobile was then transferred to the employer using the certified copy, and the Texas
Motor Vehicle Division issued a new certificate showing the bank as lienholder. Meanwhile
the debtor, who had retained possession of the automobile, sold it using the clean original.
Without mention of the U.C.C., the court held that under the title act, "a title which ema-
nates under an original certificate is superior to that which emanates under a certified copy
. . ." Id., 523 S.W.2d at 785.
91. See Certificate of Title Acts and the UCC, supra note 2, at 389. On the question
whether a duplicate is sufficient to place a purchaser on notice, the author states, "The
consumer should probably not rely on verbal assurances by the debtor as to the absence of
any security interest. Any doubt as to the 'clean' status of the title should be resolved against
purchasing the vehicle." Id.
92. See note 72 supra and accompanying text. An additional reason against automatically
granting priority to the holder of the original, is that such a rule is as arbitrary as deciding
for the party who first obtained an interest in the car, and would undoubtedly be a rule
riddled with exceptions.
93. See Ferraro v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 8 Cal.App.3d 339, 87 Cal.Rptr. 226 (1970); Spaulding
v. Peoples State Bank, 25 Ill.App.3d 118, 323 N.E.2d 143 (1975); Commerce Union Bank v.
Hunley, 10 U.C.C. Rptr. 1252 (Tenn.App. 1972).
94. For instance, in Ferraro v. Pacific Finance Corp., 8 Cal.App.3d 339, 87 Cal.Rptr. 226
(1970), the secured party never even had its lien noted on the certificate of title. Similarly,
the decision in Commerce Union Bank v. Hunley, 10 U.C.C.Rptr. 1252 (Tenn.App. 1972), was
based on estoppel: the court found that although the secured party did have a lien noted on
the certificate, the bank had discharged that loan and the debtor had signed a new security
agreement. The bank never had this new interest noted, thus a buyer at an execution sale
who received a clean title by mistake took free of the bank's interest. Finally, Spaulding v.
Peoples State Bank, 25 Ill.App.3d 118, 323 N.E.2d 143 (1975), appears to hold squarely that
"parties dealing with the vehicle described in [the] certificate may do so in reliance there-
on." Id., 323 N.E.2d at 145. However, the decision may actually be explained by the tradi-
Secured Parties-Automobiles
The title system clearly does not protect the good faith purchaser
of an automobile who relies on a clean certificate in the intrastate
setting. This view comports with the traditional analysis in multi-
state cases that as long as the secured party perfected and did
nothing to estop himself from asserting his lien, he would prevail.
The 1972 revisions to section 9-103 altered this rule when the good
faith purchaser is a consumer buyer who relies on a clean title issued
by his own state which bears no legend indicating the possibility of
other interests . 5 Whether consistency within the Code would justify
extending the same protection to a buyer in an intrastate case is the
essential question.
THE INTRASTATE DUAL CERTIFICATE PROBLEM ANALYZED WITHIN THE
U.C.C.
Section 9-307(2) apparently provides that a good faith buyer takes
subject to the interest of a secured party who has noted his interest
on the certificate of title.9" Other features of the Code, however,
indicate that 9-307(2)"7 does not necessarily control this situation.
The practical difference between automobiles and other consumer
goods is that a consumer has nothing like a title certificate on which
he can rely in second-hand sales not involving cars. More impor-
tantly, a legal difference exists between automobiles and other con-
sumer goods." A security interest in a motor vehicle must be per-
fected by compliance with the state's title legislation, 9 but most
tional rule that even a good faith purchaser cannot obtain title good as against the party from
whom the car was stolen. See note 83 supra and cases cited therein.
A good faith purchaser of a stolen automobile, or one who obtains an encumbered vehicle,
will usually have a cause of action against the person from whom the car was bought. Doherty
v. Obregon, 6 Ariz.App. 401, 433 P.2d 52 (1967); Hertz Corp. v. Hardy, 197 Pa.Super. 466,
178 A.2d 833 (1962). In the Spaulding case, Johnson, the person who had sold Spaulding the
stolen car, had been adjudged a bankrupt. Therefore, Spaulding was trying to recover the
money he'd paid the bank to discharge the loan it had made to Johnson to enable him to
buy the car. The bank thus had been a passive participant, merely loaning money and
accepting repayment on a car which later was discovered to have been a stolen vehicle. The
decision appears correct, but because of the peculiar fact situation, the holding that the bank
was entitled to rely on the certificate has little application outside of those facts.
95. See notes 62-73 supra and accompanying text. One commentator has even advocated
that the Code should protect a good faith purchaser under a clean title whose possession
derived from a thief. Furnish, supra note 2, at 301.
96. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
97. Although the text of § 9-307 does not mention certificate of title laws, the Official
Comments indicate that compliance with such legislation has the same effect as filing. U.C.C.
§ 9-307(2), Comment 3. Both thus prevent a good faith buyer from taking free of the security
interest under 9-307(2). The same result is obtained by equating filing and compliance with
the state title act. U.C.C. § 9-302(4) (1972 version). See note 10 supra.
98. Goods are" 'consumer goods' if they are used or bought for use primarily for personal,
family or household purposes." U.C.C. § 9-109(1).
99. U.C.C. § 9-302(4).
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security interests in other consumer goods are perfected without any
action by the secured party.'0 This difference is important because
it determines the applicability of section 9-307(2),11 which protects
consumer good faith buyers in second-hand sales against perfected
security interests. 02 The section also provides that a secured party
may by filing prevent such a buyer from taking free of the interest.0 3
Section 9-302(4) equates filing and compliance with title legisla-
tion,'04 therefore notation on the certificate of title, as well as filing
prevents a buyer from taking free of the secured party's interest. 10
Notation then, both perfects the security interest and defeats the
buyer's protection under 9-307(2),101 making any guarantee to con-
sumer buyers against perfected security interests in motor vehicles
totally illusory. Therefore, section 9-307(2) has no application what-
ever to automobiles covered by title certificates.'07
Since 9-307(2) fails to protect the consumer good faith purchaser
of an automobile when the secured party has perfected by notation,
the section does not control the intrastate dual certificate situation.
Still the disparate results in the multi-state and the single state
settings remain, except that the intrastate case is governed by gen-
eral rules regarding the effect of perfection, 08 and the continuity of
security interests.'00 These contradictory results thus exist due to
the absence of a provision protecting the non-professional buyer
under a clean title in the single state context, rather than by clearly
conflicting sections.
Although the Code fails to protect the consumer good faith pur-
100. U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (a) & (d).
101. Professor Gilmore states unequivocally and correctly that "§ 9-307(2) does not apply
to motor vehicles subject to licensing requirements (even if the motor vehicles are held as
consumer goods .... )" 2 G. GILMORE, SEcurry INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 26.12
(1st ed. 1965).
102. U.C.C. § 9-307(2).
103. Id.
104. U.C.C. § 9-302(4).
105. See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
106. In other words, notation acts as a catalyst for the operation of 9-307(2) since a
security interest must be perfected. Otherwise U.C.C. § 9-301(c) would apply, giving the
buyer priority over an unperfected security interest. In addition, though, notation is the very
act which defeats the buyer's protection.
107. This conclusion is buttressed by a consideration of how 9-307(2) applies to interests
in consumer goods which do not require any action by the secured party for perfection.
Section 9-307(2) is meant to give "a measure of protection against such 'secret liens' to certain
types of buyers." 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 26.12 (1st ed.
1965). By allowing the secured party to do more (i.e. file) than what is required for perfection,
the Code provides a method for giving public notice of such a perfected lien. Thus, only when
such notice is not necessary for perfection does 9-307(2) serve a purpose.
108. U.C.C. § 9-301; see U.C.C. § 9-306.
109. U.C.C. § 9-306(2); U.C.C. § 9-201.
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chaser in the intrastate setting, the U.C.C. contains some support
for allowing such a purchaser to take free of a prior security interest
perfected by notation. For example, there is a difference between
perfection by filing and perfection by notation. Although the Code
provides that compliance with certificate of title laws is the equiva-
lent of filing," 0 a closer examination of revised section 9-103(2) re-
veals that notation is not always exactly equal to filing.
Under revised section 9-103(2), a secured party who perfects by
notation does not always receive the same protection as one who
perfects by filing."' The secured party who perfects by notation has
more protection in multi-state transactions because perfection is
"governed by the law. . . of the jurisdiction issuing the certificate
until four months after the goods are removed from that jurisdiction
and thereafter until the goods are registered in another jurisdiction,
110. U.C.C. § 9-302(4) (1972 version) provides:
Compliance with a statute or treaty described in subsection (3) is equivalent to the
filing of afinancing statement under this Article, and a security interest in property
subject to the statute or treaty can be perfected only by compliance therewith
except as provided in Section 9-103 on multiple state transactions. Duration and
renewal of perfection of a security interest perfected by compliance with the statute
or treaty are governed by the provisions of the statute or treaty; in other respects
the security interest is subject to this Article.
The statutes referred to are to include "any certificate of title statute covering automobiles
. ... U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(b) (1972 version). The unrevised version of these subsections read:
(3) The filing provisions of this Article do not apply to a security interest in
property subject to a statute
Alternative A-
(b) of this state which provides for central filing of, or which requires indication
on a certificate of title of, such security interests in such property.
Alternative B-
(b) of this state which provides for central filing of security interests in such
property, or in a motor vehicle which is not inventory held for sale for which a
certificate of title is required under the statutes of this state if a notation of such a
security interest can be indicated by a public official on a certificate or a duplicate
thereof.
(4) A security interest in property covered by a statute described in subsection (3)
can be perfected only by registration or filing under that statute or by indication
of the security interest on a certificate of title or duplicate thereof by a public
official.
U.C.C. § 9-302(3) (1958 version). Alternative A was meant for states with exclusive or com-
plete title acts, while Alternative B was designed to pick up the non-exclusive acts and make
them exclusive. U.C.C. § 9-302, Comment 8; GILMORE, supra note 2, at 573-76. Subsection
4 is a variant of the same principle, that the security interest is perfected by notation in
compliance with the certificate of title act, and not by Article 9 filing. GILMORE, supra note
2, at 576.
111. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 7; Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv.
L. REV. 477 (1973); Funk, The Proposed Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, Part 2, 27 Bus. LAW. 321 (1971); Furnish, supra note 2; Resolving Conflicts, supra note
45.
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.. . ,"I An interest noted on the certificate of title may then re-
main perfected past the initial four month period following removal,
as long as the car is not registered in another state. On the other
hand, the secured party who perfects otherwise than by notation'"
is subject to the four month rule of revised section 9-103(1)(d),"' and
must take affirmative action to reperfect within that period or he
will lose all priority after removal." 5 Thus if the security interest is
perfected by notation, the secured party may be protected indefi-
nitely after removal without any action, although a security interest
perfected by filing will lose priority unless the secured party takes
steps to reperfect.
The secured party who has perfected through compliance with
title laws has less protection than one who has filed, since if he has
not retained the certificate, the period of continuous perfection may
be reduced by "surrender of the certificate.""' Even if he somehow
reperfects within the four months, he may not have priority as
against someone who purchased"' after surrender of the certificate
112. U.C.C. § 9-103(2)(b) (1972 version) (emphasis added).
113. U.C.C. § 9-103(2)(c) (1972 version).
114. U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d) (1972 version) reads:
(d) When collateral is brought into and kept in this state while subject to a
security interest perfected under the law of the jurisdiction from which the collat-
eral was removed, the security interest remains perfected, but if action is required
by Part 3 of this Article to perfect the security interest,
(i) if the action is not taken before the expiration of the period of perfection in
the other jurisdiction or the end of four months after the collateral is brought into
this state, whichever period first expires, the security interest becomes unperfected
at the end of that period and is thereafter deemed to have been unperfected as
against a person who became a purchaser after removal;
(ii) if the action is taken before the expiration of the period specified in subpara-
graph (i), the security interest continues perfected thereafter;
(iii) for the purpose of priority over a buyer of consumer goods (subsection (2) of
Section 9-307), the period of the effectiveness of a filing in the jurisdiction from
which the collateral is removed is governed by the rules with respect to perfection
in subparagraphs (i) and (ii).
The language of 9-103(1)(d)(iii) indicates that if the holder of a purchase money security
interest in consumer goods wishes to continue his added protection against good faith pur-
chasers, he must refile. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 236.
115. See FINAL REPoir, supra note 7, at 236.
116. U.C.C. § 9-103(2)(b) (1972 version). The language "but in any event not beyond
surrender of the certificate" is one remaining ambiguity in 9-103(2). It is not clear whether it
means surrender of the certificate to the debtor, or to a motor vehicle department for the
purpose of issuing a new one. Furthermore, since surrender of the original certificate is a usual
requisite to issuance of a new one, the language could be interpreted to mean "but in any
event not beyond issuance of a new certificate." If this is what the language meant, the dual
title problem when the purchaser is a dealer, would be immensely clarified, but as it is written
now, 9-103(2) only resolves dual certificate cases when the buyer is a non-professional.
117. "Purchaser" here is used in the Code sense of "taking by sale, discount, negotiation,
mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an
interest in property." U.C.C. § 1-201(32).
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and before the reperfection.
These differences under revised section 9-103 do not affect resolu-
tion of dual certificate conflicts."' Nonetheless the differences are
significant since they suggest that filing is not necessarily equal to
compliance with certificate of title laws in all situations."' There-
fore, perfection by notation should not necessarily have the same
consequences in the intrastate context as perfection by filing, just
as the two do not have the identical effect in multi-state transac-
tions.
Article Two provides further support for preferring the good faith
purchaser under a clean title. Section 2-403, the Code provision
dealing with good faith purchasers of goods, guarantees that such a
purchaser may obtain good title from a person with voidable title.21
The Code defines neither title nor voidable title,121 therefore it is
debatable whether a debtor has voidable title by which he could
pass good title *to a good faith'purchaser under 2-403. A security
interest does not "attach," however, until the debtor "has rights in
the collateral.' 1 22 Although the U.C.C. does not explain what is
meant by having rights in the collateral, it is submitted that these
rights are sufficiently analogous to the concept of voidable title to
118. Note that § 9-103(2)(d), which controls such conflicts, does not distinguish between
perfection by notation and perfection by filing, and thus makes it clear that even in the non-
or incomplete title to title context, a consumer good faith purchaser who relies on a local clean
title which requires notation of security interests will prevail over the foreign secured party.
In the intrastate setting, of course, there won't be such a context. Therefore, the failure of 9-
103(2)(d) to differentiate between the two methods of perfection does not affect the argument
that because 9-103 provides different consequences for perfection by notation and perfection
by filing, perhaps the intrastate section protecting purchasers, 9-307, should distinguish
between filing and notation as well.
119. Note that this conclusion contradicts U.C.C. § 9-302(4) (1972 version), which states
that filing and compliance with title legislation are equivalents.
120. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) provides:
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power
to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the
extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer
a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered
under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
For a general discussion of the applicability of § 2-403 to Article 9, see Dugan, Buyer-Secured
Party Conflicts Under Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 46 U. COLO. L. REV.
333, 335-37 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dugan].
121. The Code's failure to define these concepts means that § 2-403 is not precluded from
application to Article 9 by an inflexible definition of title.
122. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c) (1972 version); U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1958 version).
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warrant application of 2-403.113 It is not suggested that 2-403 should
affect priorities in all cases between Article Nine secured parties
and good faith purchasers of collateral, 12' but when Article Nine
itself is not clear,125 "extending [other] code provisions by way of
analogy and extrapolation" is preferable to resort to non-Code
law. 126 Since section 9-103(2)(d) protects good faith purchasers
under clean titles only in multi-state transactions, and 9-307(2) does
not control the intrastate buyer-secured party conflict, section 2-403
may be applied to protect the good faith purchaser.'"
Finally, the Code provides that it may be supplemented by prin-
ciples of law and equity. 128 For example, in Muir v. Jefferson Credit
123. Support for this analogy between the concepts of title on the one hand, and security
interests and the debtor's counterpart, "rights in the collateral," on the other, may be found
in the definition of a security interest. "The retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods
notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer . . . is limited in effect to a reservation
of a 'security interest'." U.C.C. § 1-201(37); see U.C.C. § 2-401 (1). Furthermore, since the
validity and enforceability of a security interest as between the parties does not depend on
title, (see note 122 supra), neither should rights as against third parties. Whether the debtor
actually has voidable title under the particular security agreement, then, should not deter-
mine whether a good faith purchaser of an automobile under a clear title may defeat the rights
of a perfected secured party in the same state. Finally, § 2-403 states that "[wihen goods
have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has. . . power [to transfer
good title to a good faith purchaser]." Therefore at least when the secured party is also the
seller, the debtor purchaser probably has voidable title, if not in other secured transactions
as well.
124. Indeed, several Code provisions appear to preclude application of 2-403 to buyer-
secured party disputes. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (which provides that a security interest
continues despite a sale, "[e]xcept where this Article provides otherwise") (emphasis
added); U.C.C. § 2-402(3) ([n]othing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the rights of
creditors of the seller" under Article 9); U.C.C. § 2-403(4) ("[t]he rights of other purchasers
of goods and of lien creditors are governed by the Articles on Secured Transactions. .... ).
But see U.C.C. § 9-201 ("[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement is
effective . . . against purchasers of the collateral .... ") (emphasis added).
125. The lack of clarity is evidenced by the basic conflict between 9-103(2)(d) in the
multi-state setting and the result which appears to be mandated by a combination of 9-201,
9-301, 9-306(2), and 9-307(2) (and the Official Comment thereto) in the single state context.
See notes 7-11 supra and accompanying text.
126. Hawkland, Article 9 Methodology, 9 WAYNE L. Rzv. 531, 532 (1963). Professor Hawk-
land notes,
Standard code methodology utilizes analogy to fill gaps, an approach designed to
give the enactment comprehensiveness and to implement legislative design by ex-
tending the underlying reasons, purposes and policies of the various provisions to
their analogues. The approach also steers the court from error by keeping it from
resorting to rules and principles which have become obsolete or have been defeated
by competing policies.
Id., at 535.
127. See Dugan, supra note 120, wherein the author states that the "interarticle ordering
provisions," see note 124 supra, "preclude the application of Article 2 only when the facts of
the conflict are sufficiently covered by one of the Article 9 exceptions to the secured party's
basic priority." Id., at 336 (emphasis added). Section 9-307(2) does not really apply to motor
vehicles, see text accompanying notes 96-107 supra. Therefore, § 2-403 provides a strong basis
for protecting a good faith purchaser under a clean title in the intrastate setting.
128. "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and
Secured Parties-Automobiles
Corp. ," the secured party perfected by notation, and the subsequent
good faith purchaser bought from the dealer to whom the debtor had
sold the car after he had forged a satisfaction of the secured party's
lien. Section 9-307(1) did not apply because the interest had not
been created by the purchaser's immediate seller, and 9-307(2) did
not protect the purchaser because the car was not "consumer goods"
in the hands of the seller.' 30 The court then held that despite the
failure of 9-307 to protect the purchaser, he was entitled to the car
because the secured party was estopped for its failure to retain the
certificate in its possession, and for its failure to act reasonably to
protect its interest.' 3' This approach provides a basis for extending
protection to such a purchaser under a clean duplicate, despite a
perfected security interest. Nonetheless, it is inadequate because
the decision is essentially a return to chaotic pre-Code law. A better
approach would exist if Article Nine clearly determined the fate of
a good faith purchaser under a clean title. The Code's failure to
resolve these controversies mandates an examination of the policy
grounds favoring the consumer good faith purchaser.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The revised Code changed the traditional rule favoring the se-
cured party in the multi-state context, to one favoring the consumer
buyer who relies on a clean local certificate. The only reason given
for the change was the policy that the local buyer under such cir-
cumstances is deserving of protection.3 1 One problem with the ap-
proach of the common law and the unrevised U.C.C. to multi-state
transactions was the failure to assess the conflicting policies. In
either the multi-state or the intrastate setting, this conflict can be
characterized as a question of whether it is "fairer and more in
accord with commercial reality" to protect the secured party who
has done all that the law requires of him to make his interest good
against third parties, or "to give an expanded kind of bonafide
purchaser status to [one] who deal[s] with the vehicle"' on the
basis of a clean certificate.
equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and
agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." U.C.C. § 1-103.
129. 108 N.J.Super. 586, 262 A.2d 33 (1970).
130. Id., at 36. See note 98 supra.
131. Jefferson placed the blame on the motor vehicle division for delivering the title to
the debtor. Id., at 38. The court noted, though, that although Jefferson had almost immediate
awareness that it had not received the certificate, its efforts to obtain it were minimal, and
it made no attempt to repossess the car until long after the fraud was committed. Id., at 38.
132. FINAL REPoRT, supra note 7, at 241.
133. Rohner, supra note 2, at 1181.
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The Uniform Commercial Code usually resolves this conflict in
favor of a non-professional buyer in the multi-state transaction.'
Consistency within the Code is one cogent reason for extending the
same protection to such a buyer in a single state controversy. Fur-
thermore, a preference for one holding a clean certificate of title
enhances the reliability of certificates as notice instruments,' 35 and
promotes free alienability of used motor vehicles.' 36 Increased relia-
bility of title certificates in turn means greater certainty in the sales
of used automobiles. 37
As between the perfected secured party and the consumer good
faith buyer, the equities lie on the consumer's side. On the basis of
risk allocation alone, the lender should bear the risk as a cost of
doing business.1 3 Furthermore, protective measures are not equally
available to creditor and purchaser.
Secured parties are deserving of some protection, but they are also
in the best position to prevent the fraudulent transaction from ever
occurring. They are generally large enough to engage in a certain
amount of tracing, and they also voluntarily choose to deal with
the person who commits the fraudulent act. Secured parties could
prevent many of the frauds from ever occurring by diligently
checking the recipients of their credit. If a secured party chooses
to deal with a high credit risk customer, he should insulate himself
against fraud by purchasing insurance, efficiently tracing. . . ve-
hicles, or increasing rates to all customers in order to absorb
losses.'
A purchaser, on the other hand, can hardly be expected to question
his own state's certificate of title,'4 0 and is probably unaware of
means other than the certificate to ascertain title.
Finally, the difference between a consumer purchaser and a pro-
fessional buyer justifies extending protection only to the former. A
134. See notes 67-73 supra and accompanying text.
135. Note, The Near-Absolute Rights of the Holder ofan Ohio Motor Vehicle Certificate
of Title, 15 W. Rs. L. Ray. 785, 789 (1964).
136. Id. Motor vehicles are a significant part of commerce in the United States. In 1977
net purchases of used automobiles totalled $17.9 billion, almost one third of all automobile
purchases. SURVEY OF Cv mTR r Busmzmss, May 1978, at 8.
137. There is a corresponding decrease in the certainty of financing transactions in motor
vehicles, which contravenes the policy of Article 9 "to provide a simple and unified structure
within which the immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go for-
ward with less cost and with greater certainty." U.C.C. § 9-101, Official Comment. If this
goal is deemed outweighed by the interest of a consumer good faith purchaser who relies on
a clean title in a multi-state transaction, there is no reason why the aim is not also overridden
by such a purchaser in the intrastate context.
138. See Rohner, supra note 2, at 1185-86; Resolving Conflicts, supra note 45, at 1002.
139. Resolving Conflicts, supra note 45, at 1002.
140. Rohner, supra note 2, at 1181.
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consumer buyer is the person most likely to rely on a certificate of
title,' whereas a professional buyer may be expected to be on the
alert for undisclosed security interests.4 2
CONCLUSION
The Review Committee when redrafting section 9-103 made a
clear policy choice to protect a non-professional purchaser of an
automobile under a clean title, despite the existence of a foreign
perfected security interest. Yet Article Nine also suggests that the
secured party will be protected in the analogous intrastate context.
Policy considerations, as well as consistency within the Code, indi-
cate that Article Nine should be clarified to give protection to con-
sumer buyers under clean titles in both the single and the multi-
state settings.
ELLEN BEVERLEY
141. See Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L. Rv. 477, 545 (1973).
142. Id.
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